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ECONOMISTS AS JUDGES: A SELECTIVE,
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
JANET SINDER*
This bibliography focuses on the role of judges in applying the values of
law and economics, particularly the role of those judges trained in economics.
It also includes articles on how economics can be used by judges in certain
cases, even if a judge does not have a background in economics. Finally, this
bibliography contains articles on whether economic values should be
considered and promoted by the judicial system.
Ackerman, Bruce A. "Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture."
Duke Law Journal (1986): 929-47.
Ackerman considers how the law and economics movement might be
changing the language used by lawyers, and whether this will then change
the outcomes of cases. The article reaches no conclusions, rather it poses
the questions for consideration. Ackerman mentions that his personal
thoughts on the subject are contained in his book, Reconstructing American
Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Becker, Edward R. "The Uses of 'Law and Economics' by Judges." Journal of
Legal Education 33 (1983): 306-10.
Judge Becker discusses the areas to which he believes law and economics
scholars have paid too little attention: evidence by economists at trial and
the economics of judicial administration. He argues that lawyers need to
be trained to present law and economics analysis to the court in
appropriate cases. He also considers ways that this analysis should be used
by lawyers, and gives a judge's perspective on what factors will influence
decisions.
Breyer, Stephen. "Economics for Lawyers and Judges." Journal of Legal
Education 33 (1983): 294-305.
Breyer considers the role of economics in antitrust and economic
regulation. He finds economics relevant to these fields for two reasons:
because it influences the rules of law in these fields, and because economic
facts are so often used as evidence in antitrust and economic regulation
cases. Breyer gives examples and argues that because economics is used
so frequently, law students should be taught some basic economic theory.
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Cohen, George M. "Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law:
The View from the Bench." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133
(1985): 1117-66.
Cohen analyzes Posner's work on the bench and uses it as a means of
discussing the strengths and weaknesses of economic analysis of law. The
article gives a brief explanation of the economic theory of law and then
considers how Posner has utilized it in his decisionmaking. Cohen
criticizes Posner for not using economic analysis consistently and for not
realizing its limitations.
Daynard, Richard A. "Use of Social Policy in Judicial Decision-Making."
Cornell Law Review 56 (1971): 919-50.
For this 1971 article, Daynard analyzed 300 then recent cases decided by
three courts: the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and District of
Columbia Circuits, and the New York Court of Appeals. He looked to see
whether social policy had been used as a basis for court opinions, and
concluded that it was employed in only a small percentage of cases. This
early article can be used as a basis for comparing how social and economic
policy are now used by judges.
Easterbrook, Frank H. "Foreword: The Court and the Economic System."
Harvard Law Review 98 (1984): 1-60.
Easterbrook examines decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, mainly from
the 1983 term, to illustrate his theory that the Court has become
economically sophisticated. He considers three economic principles: ex
ante analysis, understanding effects at the margins, and appreciating the
interest group underpinnings of statutes. Easterbrook finds these
principles present throughout the Court's holdings. He thus concludes
that the Supreme Court is asking economic questions and seems to be
employing economic analysis.
Easterbrook, Frank H. "Method, Result and Authority: A Reply." Harvard
Law Review 98 (1985): 622-29.
This piece is a response to Laurence Tribe's "Constitutional Calculus."'
Easterbrook claims he did not argue that judges should perform cost-
benefit analysis. He gives reasons why people, including judges and
lawyers, should and do ask economic questions even though economic
analysis will not be dispositive of the issue: because they may add extra
information which will tip the balance in a particular case. Easterbrook
disagrees with Tribe's belief that judges should uphold certain values or
be involved in the redistribution of wealth.
Easterbrook, Frank H. "Statutes' Domains." University of Chicago Law Review
50 (1983): 533-52.
Here Easterbrook uses economic considerations to discuss the situations
under which courts construe statutes, and when they decide a statute is
inapplicable-meaning that its specific language is irrelevant. He says that
1. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficieny, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985).
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unless a statute clearly gives courts the power to create and revise a form
of common law, the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases
anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process.
In all other cases the court should hold the statute inapplicable. One
reason for this proposal is that courts cannot be sure why a statute is
worded in a particular way, so they cannot know how the legislature would
have decided a specific question.
Ehrlich, Isaac, and Richard A. Posner. "An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking." Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1974): 257-86.
The authors examine the degree of specificity of a legal rule as a
determinant of the efficiency of the legal process. They distinguish
between rules, which are specific, and standards, such as
"reasonableness," which are not specific.
Fox, Eleanor M. "The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision
Making: Antitrust as a Window." New York University Law Review 61
(1986): 554-88.
Fox uses examples from antitrust law as a way to test whether economics is
value free, as Frank Easterbrook argues, or rather is "ideology
masquerading as knowledge," as Laurence Tribe argues. She says that
economists can hide their political motivations behind their economics,
making it hard for those not skilled in economics to detect these
motivations and present the opposing economic argument. Fox feels that
decisions in some areas, such as constitutional law, should disregard
economics. In others, for example antitrust, judges should take care not
to let economics be the only consideration. Lawyers and judges should
not confuse economics with law.
Gerhart, Peter M. "The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near)
Triumph of the Chicago School." Supreme Court Review (1982): 319-49.
This article discusses the antitrust analysis employed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Gerhart argues that until the Court's decision in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society, 2 the Court had been formulating a cohesive antitrust
policy which considered the efficiency of its rules. He concludes that
antitrust analysis would improve if the Court, rather than applying per se
rules, looked at restraints of trade to determine whether they improve
efficiency.
Golbert, J.P., and Paul Lowenstein. "The Court and the Marketplace: Who
Should Regulate Whom?" Baylor Law Review 34 (1982): 39-65.
The authors argue that because the market system will always be
imperfect, courts should regulate the market, imposing society's ethical
values, rather than having the marketplace regulate the law. This article
considers several examples which illustrate the fact that not everyone has
equal access to the marketplace. This lack of access, the authors contend,
means that the market cannot correctly reflect society's values.
2. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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Grady, Mark F. "A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence." Yale Law
Journal 92 (1983): 799-829.
Grady analyzes formal negligence rules under the conventional theory of
negligence law, and proposes an alternative rule which he says is more
likely to lead to minimum social cost under uncertain conditions. He
contends that this new rule is more consistent with actual court decisions.
The new rule proposes a cost-benefit approach which would compare
costs and benefits of a precaution not taken by the defendant if that
precaution was a "but for" cause of the accident. If the benefits outweigh
the costs then the defendant is liable.
Greenwalt, Kent. "Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision." Georgia Law Review
11 (1977): 991-1053.
This article criticizes Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights, rejecting the
distinction Dworkin draws between principles and policies. (Dworkin says
judges should not base their decisions on policy, only principles.)
Greenwalt is also critical of Dworkin's belief that judges should base all
decisions on institutional materials (i.e., precedent or statute). He believes
there are cases where judges should and do decide based upon policy
concerns for social welfare, rather than on institutionalized rights.
Hansmann, Henry. "The Current State of Law-and-Economics Scholarship."
Journal of Legal Education 33 (1983): 217-36.
This article is a discussion and review of law and economics writings.
Hansmann reviews the scholarship in various fields of law and concludes
that "the extent to which law-and-economics scholarship has developed in
any given field of law seems to be directly proportional to the amount of
judge-made law that is to be found in that field." He also discusses what
this type of analysis has contributed to the law, and what he considers
some methodological problems.
Landes, William M. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts." Journal of Law and
Economics 14 (1971): 61-107.
Landes analyzes the criminal justice system, using the tools of economic
theory and statistics. He assumes prosecutors will attempt to maximize the
number of convictions weighted by sentence length, subject to budget
constraints, and the defendant will maximize "expected utility of his
endowments in various states of the world." Both can influence the
outcome by the amount of resources they put into a case. The article also
lists the major implications of this model.
Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. "The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective." Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1975):
875-901.
The authors say that economic analysis may be able to reconcile what
many think of as the conflicting notions of an independent judiciary and a
political system which emphasizes the importance of interest groups. This
reconciliation can be accomplished by recognizing that an independent
judiciary will enforce continuity in the law by looking to the intention of
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the legislature that originally enacted the legislation. Thus, once
bargained-for legislation has been enacted, it will have longer-term, and
therefore greater, value to those who bargained for it. This article
contains an appendix of empirical studies of judicial independence which
examine the number of times the courts have nullified acts of Congress.
Lempert, Richard. "Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld."
Columbia Law Review 85 (1985): 1098-116.
Lempert discusses the introduction of statistical evidence with regard to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. He disagrees with Rubinfeld's argument
that the required level of significance be chosen so as to affect the behavior
of the litigants (that is, making it more or less likely that they will go to
trial), because one cannot be sure what the effects of such changes will be.
He concludes that ultimately the use of statistics in the courtroom must be
governed by legal values.
Michelman, Frank I. "A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in
Law." University of Chicago Law Review 46 (1979): 307-15.
In reaction to Posner's article,3 Michelman argues that Posner's hypothesis
should be understood to mean that judges act as though they were
following economic principles, not that these principles are a correct
description of the world or that the judges' decisions bring about
"economically virtuous" results.
Miller, Jeremy M. "Economic Analysis of Legal Method and Law: The Danger
in Valueless Values." Gonzaga Law Review 21 (1985-86): 425-55.
Miller focuses on Posner's views about criminal law in considering the
validity of using efficiency as the central legal value. He concludes that by
emphasizing efficiency Posner is ignoring fairness, and he criticizes Posner
for being willing to sacrifice moral values if they appear to be inefficient.
Posner, Richard A. "Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger, and Potential Competition
Decisions." Columbia Law Review 75 (1975): 282-327.
Posner considers antitrust decisions of the United States Supreme Court
on restricted distribution, horizontal merger, and potential competition
according to what he considers coherent rules, and finds that the Court
has not followed rules consistent with a general theory of antitrust liability.
He claims that the Court has done an unsatisfactory job of relating its
decisions to the purposes of the antitrust statutes.
Posner, Richard A. "Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law." University
of Chicago Law Review 46 (1979): 281-306.
This article attempts to give a brief overview of economic analysis of law.
The discussion of the "positive economic analysis of law," defined as the
use of economic analysis to explain what has been or to predict what will
be, reviews some literature on the economic analysis of judicial
decisionmaking. Positive analysis is distinguished from normative
3. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 281-306 (1979).
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analysis, which concerns itself with whether economic efficiency should be
the goal of the legal system.
Posner, Richard A. "Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making."
International Review of Law and Economics 4 (1984): 131-35.
A comment on Samuels and Mercuro's "Posnerian Law and Economics on
the Bench." 4 Posner discusses his beliefs about the actual and the
appropriate role of wealth maximization in the decisions of federal courts
of appeals. He says that wealth maximization is the only social value
courts have the power to promote.
Priest, George L. "The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules."Journal of Legal Studies 6 (1977): 65-82.
Priest argues in this article that economically efficient rules are more likely
to endure regardless of the attitudes of individual judges toward efficiency,
or the interest or ability ofjudges or litigants in developing efficient rules.
Inefficient rules will prove more costly to the parties subject to them.
Thus, those parties will be more likely to relitigate those rules until the
rules eventually become more efficient, even where judges prefer
inefficiency.
Rizzo, Mario J. "The Mirage of Efficiency." Hofstra Law Review 8 (1980): 641-
58.
Rizzo contends that in order to determine whether legal rules are efficient
for society in general, rather than only between litigants, more information
is required than can realistically be obtained by courts. Therefore, it is
impossible for judges to make decisions on the basis of efficiency, and this
value should be disregarded as impractical.
Rubinfeld, Daniel L. "Econometrics in the Courtroom." Columbia Law Review
85 (1985): 1048-97.
This article considers the uses of statistical evidence in the courts.
Rubinfeld argues that courts need to use an "instrumentalist, efficiency-
oriented" criterion to determine the appropriate standard of proof with
regard to statistical evidence. He concludes that the role of neutral
experts to evaluate statistical evidence should be expanded and that
reform of the methods of presentation of statistical information to the trier
of fact is needed. He argues that by setting statistical standards courts are
assessing the comparative social costs of each outcome.
Samuels, Warren J., and Nicholas Mercuro. "Posnerian Law and Economics
on the Bench." International Review of Law and Economics 4 (1984): 107-30.
The authors examine Judge Posner's court decisions between 1981 and
1983, to see how his theory of wealth maximization has affected these
decisions and what the decisions reveal about this approach.
Shepherd, William G. "Economics in Court: An 8-Case Antitrust Summary."
Antitrust Law & Economics Review 18, no. 2 (1986): 75-83.
4. Samuels & Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 Irr'L REV. L. EcON. 107-30
(1984).
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Shepherd, an economist, summarizes eight antitrust cases with which he
was involved. In addition to presenting an economist's opinion of the
effect of the courts' rulings, he provides an insider's view of the cases.
Sullivan, Lawrence A. "Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections
on Some Recent Relationships." California Law Review 68 (1980): 1-12.
This article, a speech given by Sullivan at Boalt Hall Law School, discusses
the application by the courts of the value of efficiency to antitrust cases.
Sullivan feels that this trend reflects a policy of seeing markets as the way
to solve social problems. He predicts that the economics used by courts
will evolve beyond static price theory, and says that courts should not
surrender to economists the value judgments that rightfully should be
made both by the courts and the Congress.
Tribe, Laurence H. "Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency." Harvard Law Review 98 (1985): 592-62 1.
In this piece Tribe criticizes Judge Easterbrook's praise for the U.S.
Supreme Court's adoption of cost-benefit analysis. Tribe considers that
Easterbrook's advocacy of an ex ante approach (looking at the
consequences of decisions on other parties rather than fairness to the
parties involved) evinces a disregard for the wealth distribution
dimensions of problems. He argues that courts should choose the values
our society desires to support rather than perpetuating the values that
already exist. To illustrate his theory, Tribe analyzes a number of recent
Supreme Court decisions.
Wilson, James G. "Justice Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's
Conservatism with the Views of Five Conservative, Academic Judges."
University of Miami Law Review 40 (1986): 913-75.
Wilson examines the constitutional jurisprudence of Judges Bork, Scalia,
Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter. In the first part of this two-part article
he summarizes the philosophy of Edmund Burke and concludes that these
judges do not adhere to Burkean conservatism. Wilson believes that
Burke would be more willing to defer to previous court decisions as
embodying the country's collective wisdom than these jurists, who argue
that in many cases the Supreme Court has acted illegitimately.
Wilson, James G. "Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of
Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter." University of Miami
Law Review 40 (1986): 1171-266.
This second article by Wilson examines the decisions of Judges Bork,
Scalia, Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter on constitutional issues. Wilson
concludes that these men are not as conservative on the bench as in their
academic writings. He explores how "judicial power does and does not
temper public beliefs" in the case of these judges, all of whom previously
were academics. Wilson, however, finds that individual constitutional
rights are the exception to their general philosophy, because all of them
believe judicial review is illegitimate.
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Zwier, Paul J. "The Consequentialist/Nonconsequentialist Ethical
Distinction: A Tool for the Formal Appraisal of Traditional Negligence
and Economic Tort Analysis." Boston College Law Review 26 (1985): 905-44.
This article argues that the traditional method of analyzing and deciding
tort cases, using "fault" language, is preferable to economic analysis.
Zwier discusses the ethics of both systems and concludes that economic
analysis is not ethically superior to negligence analysis-both are based on
beliefs and assumptions. He criticizes the claim of legal economists that
their system is superior because it is based on logic. As these predictions
must be based on subjective assumptions about values, they are no better
in predicting what the value of the decisions' consequences will be to
society in the future.
